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 Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War spawned a series of systemic changes that re-defined global 
governance. One such change was the evolution of conflict: post-Cold War era conflicts have 
been characterized by the shift towards intra-state clashes and away from the inter-state 
ideological warfare of the preceding thirty years.1 The act of enforcing peace has thus taken on 
a new dimension, one that has seen the United Nations (UN) adopt a primary position as an 
advocate, enforcer and builder of peace within states.2 What we have seen is a shift in 
methodology and practice within UN peacekeeping missions; the lines between the differing 
practices of peacekeeping3 and peacebuilding have been blurred. Hybridisation and integration 
have become the necessary evolutionary developments by which the UN peacekeeping 
diaspora have facilitated the re-building and stabilisation of conflict affected states.4 In short, 
peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions have developed to encompass a multi-dimensional 
character, responsible for providing the interwoven elements of security, development and 
humanitarian aid.5 Coherence and coordination6 within these missions has been the driving 
mechanism behind facilitating this integration. 
 The increased complexity of the situations peacekeeping agents are involved in has 
created a network structure of unprecedented size and scope.7 Peacekeeping missions now 
encapsulate a variety of actors operating under both competing and complementary mandates 
to achieve a diverse array of goals that go beyond the simple enforcement of peace. Peace 
enforcement itself has also changed, given that peacebuilding missions are not universally 
deployed in post-conflict zones: Haiti serves as an example of a mission conducted within a 
																																																						
1 Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War Era." International Journal on World 
Peace (2007): 11-13.  
2 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, UN ideas that changed the world (Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 163-167.  
3 Given the nature of modern peacekeeping/peacebuilding processes, and the blending of what were once distinct 
practices, this paper will use “peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding” as interchangeable terms. Historically, 
peacekeeping is defined as “the deployment of military or police personnel to oversee the implementation of a 
peace agreement”, and peacebuilding defined as “action on the far side of conflict aimed at identifying and 
supporting structures that could prevent the recurrence of violence.” Louise Riis Andersen and Peter Emil 
Engedal, Blue helmets and grey zones: Do UN multidimensional peace operations work? 2013: 29. DIIS Reports, 
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013; 15. 
4 Cedric De Coning, "Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions." Security in Practice 5 (2007): 2. 
5 Peter Uvin, "The development/peacebuilding nexus: a typology and history of changing paradigms." Journal 
of Peacebuilding & Development 1, no. 1 (2002): 5. 
6 Coherence among the international actors can be viewed as the goal, with coordination being the method to 
achieve coherence. Coherence can thus be described as the how various entities and agents coordinate their 
goals, priorities and methods in peacekeeping endeavors.   
7 Yeshi Choedon, "The United Nations Peacebuilding in Kosovo: The Issue of Coordination." International 
Studies 47, no. 1 (2010): 41-43. 
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state that is not or has not been at war but requires security operations to enforce political 
stability.8 The inter-subjective dimensions of the peacebuilding processes require different 
standards and different practices relevant to each individual case. As such, the mechanisms that 
have been created to facilitate peacekeeping/peacebuilding practices have evolved to reflect 
the constant need for coherence in an arena that is itself inherently chaotic. The development 
of these mechanisms has been at the heart of debates within the UN and outside of it since the 
perceived failures of peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s.9 Recently, 
eyes have re-focused towards the issue of mission coherence and co-ordination as conflict 
zones become ever-more nuanced.   
 In light of this recent turn towards inter and intra-organisational coherence within the 
UN and other international agents, it is important to situate these developments within the 
context of current peacekeeping missions. Therefore, this work is designed to situate UN 
peacekeeping developments within the context of the security-development nexus within Haiti. 
In doing so, this paper will serve a didactic purpose by describing and explaining organisational 
developments in practice. Haiti and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) represent a litmus test for modern peacekeeping co-ordination practices. It is a 
state that is tragically characterized by the apparent long running inability of its own 
government and the international community to solve its interwoven elements of poverty and 
violence, manifested in endless economic, social and political instability. Not only this, Haiti 
has been ravaged by a series of natural disasters, most notable of which is the 2010 earthquake 
that killed some 200,000 people and left over one million people homeless.10 The challenges 
posed by Haiti’s economic, social and political developmental conundrums represent one of 
the largest challenges to the UN peacebuilding apparatus in the current era.11 Despite the 
apparent significance of Haiti’s issues and the 30-year occupation of the Haitian state by the 
international community12, current developments relevant to the evolution of the integrated 
																																																						
8 Marie Pace and Ketty Luzincourt, "Haiti’s Fragile Peace: A Case Study of the Cumulative Impacts of Peace 
Practice." CDA Collaborative Learning Center (2009): 24.  
9 Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The new world of UN peace operations: 
Learning to build peace? (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2011), 11-16. 
10 Martin Hartberg, Aurelie Proust, and Michael Bailey, From Relief to Recovery: Supporting good governance 
in post-earthquake Haiti. Vol. 142. Oxfam, 2011: 2.	 
11 Reginald Dumas, "Haiti and the Regional and International Communities since January 12, 2010." In Politics 
and Power in Haiti, 161-183. (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 175-178. 
12 To indicate the scale of this involvement, within the humanitarian arena alone there are 10 UN entities and 
195 NGOs conducting disaster relief efforts; OCHA. Accessed March 10, 2017. 
http://www.unocha.org/ochain/2012-13/haiti. 
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peacebuilding process in Haiti remain somewhat unexplored within the academic world - this 
paper will aim to go some way in filling this void.  
 The purpose of this thesis is therefore to explore the issue of coordination and coherence 
in UN peacebuilding based upon the immediate post-2010 earthquake experiences of the 
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. The main question this paper will answer is as 
follows: What effective mechanisms of integration and coordination have been developed to 
solve the interwoven problems of security, development and humanitarian relief within post-
earthquake Haiti? This essay will thus have two main components: firstly, to explain the 
evolution of the MINUSTAH mission, and secondly, to identify the architecture developed by 
the UN as a means of harmonizing their peacekeeping efforts. It will begin by outlining the 
contextual situation in which the UN carries out peacekeeping, and will continue by addressing 
the formal structure of the inter-organisational network in which international actors conduct 
peacebuilding. Through an analysis of operational coherence and strategic alignment within 
the UN humanitarian system and within the integrated state-building process, this essay will 
divulge the various co-ordination practices that have been developed and explains how, 
through the operation of these mechanisms, MINUSTAH and the UN attempts to reach their 
goals. Finally, this paper will highlight the major challenges faced by the UN mission as a 
result of co-ordination problems. The primary finding of this project is that MINUSTAH and 
the UN do not struggle from a lack of coordination mechanisms. Rather, the degree to which 
integration and coherence is present, and the emphasis on horizontal coordination practices 
over vertical integration mechanisms, creates a compartmentalised peacebuilding environment 
that lacks operational coherence. 
 
Literature Review  
 
This thesis has been informed by a wide body of literature pertaining to the various disciplines 
inherently incorporated into any text regarding development and peacekeeping. United Nations 
peacekeeping and Haitian development are by themselves individual disciplines worthy of 
considerable discussion, and the combination of these fields into a singular work therefore 
provides a broad array of sources from which to draw. As such, this author has prioritised the 
sources utilised as a building block for the bulk of this essay simply as a result of feasibility 
and space. Therefore, the literature utilised as a starting point for this project follows a distinct 
focus. The following section will trace the evolution of the peacekeeping literature in relation 
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to the questions of coherence and coordination within peacekeeping projects; it will indicate 
how and why the questions of coordination have become important, and will indicate the 
specific departure point from which this project has taken off.  
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are now integrated or hybridised; they are 
mandated and designed to tackle the interwoven elements of security, development and 
humanitarian relief. The growingly complex arena of peacekeeping has facilitated considerable 
discussion in regard to mission coherence and coordination, and as a result, a number of authors 
have focused their efforts on the evolution of the development and success of peacekeeping 
practices. Michael Lipson for example, has conducted a systematic review of the UN’s 
performance assessment mechanism - the results based budgeting (RBB) system. Lipson’s 
analysis concludes that given the heterogeneity of peacekeeping missions, the UN’s RBB 
system is insufficient. In his own words: “RBB served the symbolic purpose of demonstrating 
conformity with NPM-influenced standards for management practices in pubic bureaucracies 
such as the UN”… “but is unsuited to the operational requirements of peacekeeping.”13 
However, a universally applicable assessment mechanism is non-existent; Lipson asserts that 
ambiguity within the UN system in relation to mandates and objectives renders the possibility 
of such a mechanism impossible.14 Since assessing a peacekeeping mission is a virtually 
impossible task, the literature and this thesis has orientated itself towards identifying methods 
that the UN has taken to tackle the heterogeneity evident within the peacekeeping system.  
Much of this burgeoning field of literature has concentrated on coordination practices 
within traditionally war torn states. This particular body of work has focused on coordination 
practices within the security arena. Powles et. all for example, have written extensively on the 
“importance of the integrated approach” in peacekeeping, however, their efforts are 
concentrated on multi-lateral cooperation within the arena of troop contributions in war torn 
states.15 Likewise, Stedman’s work16 on the necessities of “strategic coordination” in the 
implementation of peace agreements is noteworthy for its contribution to security operations 
in civil war terrains. But, based upon its analysis of coordination within the implementation of 
peace agreements in civil wars, it is not directly relevant to the non-traditional17 post conflict 
																																																						
13 Michael Lipson, "Performance under ambiguity: international organization performance in UN 
peacekeeping." The Review of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010): 274. 
14 Ibid., 275. 
15 Anna Powles, Negar Partow, and Nick Nelson, United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of 
the Integrated Approach, (Ashgate Publishing, 2015). 
16 Stephen John Stedman, Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements. (Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002), 89-117.  
17 As will be made evident later, Haiti is not traditionally post-conflict, given it has not or is not at war. 
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environment of Haiti. A number of additional authors have concentrated their efforts on 
developing methods for improving the efficiency of multi-lateral peacekeeping operations in 
relation to the organisational ambiguity identified by Lipson, among others.   
Roland Paris has devoted considerable attention to collaboration between international 
organisations (IOs) in post-conflict environments.18 However, like additional studies19 of this 
kind, their analyses are limited to traditional post-conflict societies, have an over emphasis on 
assessment mechanisms, and are restricted to studying cooperation between (and not within) 
multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In addition, the incorporation of 
theory into the field has led to an over-emphasis on modelling international cooperation in 
peacekeeping missions. This approach has emphasised the use of administrative theories as a 
means of analysing the structural relationship between entities in peacekeeping operations in 
order to suggest bureaucratic improvements. Oya Dursun-Ozkanca has developed the “Peace 
Building Assembly Line Model” (PALM), utilised as a framework for understanding the 
division of labor between IOs in peacekeeping missions.20 Likewise, Anna Herrhausen has 
written extensively on the theorization of peace operations. In her analysis of peace operations 
in the 20th century, Herrhausen utilizes “organisation theory” as an analytical tool to model the 
“network structures” present in multi-lateral peace operations.21 While these theories are useful 
as analytical tools, this thesis’s methodology has adopted a more descriptive, rather than 
theory-based conceptual approach. As such, the most relevant body of work utilised in this 
final section relates to practical and descriptive work that has taken on an explanatory focus. 
The primary focus of this scholarship has been to examine why and how the United Nations 
has addressed the issue of coordination and coherence within this arena on a practical level. 
The capacity of the UN to learn from its past mistakes has been analysed, to suggest that 
modern peacekeeping practices are indeed a reflection of the growingly complicated arena of 
peacekeeping.  
																																																						
18 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, "Confronting the contradictions." In The dilemmas of Statebuilding. 
Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations (2009): 57-78.  
19 Sarjoh A. Bah and Bruce D. Jones, "Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to 
Hybrid Arrangements." Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University (2008); Ho-Won 
Jeong, Peacebuilding in postconflict societies: Strategy and Process, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
20 Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, "The Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model: Towards a Theory of International 
Collaboration in Multidimensional Peacebuilding Operations." International Journal of Peace Studies 21, no. 2 
(2016): 41-57. 
21 Anna Herrhausen, “Coordination in United Nations peacebuilding: A theory-guided approach”, No. SP IV 
2007-301. WZB Discussion Paper, 2007. 
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The UN’s greater organisational capacity gave way to the introduction of a new concept 
for peacekeeping operations: The Integrated Missions (IM) concept. Cedric De Coning’s famed 
report on Coherence and Coordination in UN Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions is the 
often cited hallmark study on the creation of the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). 
De Coning’s work utilises a chronological method to detail how the UN developed a more 
coherent approach to the peacebuilding process. As he notes, “the nexus between development, 
peace and security have become the central focus of the international conflict management 
debate.”22 In order to reform the peacekeeping/peacebuilding mechanisms, the UN developed 
the Integrated Missions concept as a means of facilitating system-wide coherence across the 
UN system to combat these interconnected challenges.23 As a result,  De Coning suggests that 
the complexity of the peacebuilding process could be overcome through the harmonisation of 
security, development and humanitarian efforts between internal and external actors. As De 
Coning continued, “delivering as one” became the primary goal of the peacebuilding process, 
and only through this process could the international community successfully facilitate actual 
peace and development.   
However, the success of the integrated process is not as simple or as practical as it 
appears on paper. In fact, the shear nature of the many processes that take place on the ground 
create an environment not conducive to cooperation. As De Coning also highlighted, although 
linkages between various entities exist within and without the UN system, “agents are 
independent in that they are each legally constituted in their own right, have their own 
organisational goals and objectives, have their own access to resources, and are in control of 
those resources.”24 Despite then, that each UN agency is part of the UN system as a whole, 
they continue to maintain a degree of autonomy from the peacekeeping mission structure and 
from the established UN country office. Peacebuilding success is thus reliant upon the 
interdependency between the actors, and how this interdependence is brought about is vital to 
achieving sustainable and efficient peacekeeping/peacebuilding practices.  
   Likewise addressing the reformation process25 within the UN peacekeeping system, 
Susanna Campbell has noted that integration reforms are reflective of a broader problem within 
																																																						
22 De Coning, 2007, 2.  
23 Ibid., 5.		
24 Ibid., 9-10.  
25 The UN commissioned a series of panels and working groups in the early 2000s designed to investigate the 
issue of coordination and integration in peacekeeping/peacebuilding, such as the Brahimi Report (2000); the 
Panel on Peace operations in 2000; the working group on Transition issues in 2004; the Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change in 2005 and the Panel on System-Wide Coherence in 2006; the culmination of these 
efforts resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005.  
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the UN as a whole. Through analysing the development of the IM process and its subsequent 
implementation, Campbell asserts that “the (dis)integration of the UN system at the country 
level is also a corollary of the incoherence and competition within the home governments of 
member states.”26 For Campbell, achieving true integration and coherence is a function of both 
member state incentives as well as bureaucratic uniformity. As she continues, “the UN 
comprises two conceptually separate, but operationally interdependent, components.”27 
Functionally, the UN is an IO designed to reflect the interest of its member states, but is also a 
bureaucracy “responsible for promoting socially valued goals such as protecting human rights, 
providing development assistance, and brokering peace agreements.”28 The tensions between 
these elements, as Campbell concludes, reflects a tension between the partiality involved in 
supporting apolitical state-building and protecting humanitarian space.29 Finally, Campbell’s 
conclusion is significant in its observation that coherence within the UN system is a function 
of the UN’s internal governance structure as well as operational integration and coherence on 
the ground. Given that a number of years have passed since the initial IM processes have been 
rolled out, looking at whether the inconsistencies noted by Campbell have been addressed both 
structurally and operationally is fundamentally important to analysing peacekeeping missions 
operating nearly a decade after the IM concept was developed.  
Benner et. all’s The New World of Peace Operations is one such work which has traced 
the development of structural and systemic evolutions in relation to the peacekeeping system. 
Through a comprehensive and multiple case-study approach, Benner et. all’s work reveals that 
the UN has at least partially learned from the deficiencies of past operations. More specifically, 
Benner et. all assert that the UN’s peacekeeping apparatus is now more inclusive of peace 
operations not limited by singular and narrow mandates.30 Rather, through internal 
reassessments of the UN’s institutional weaknesses, Benner et. all conclude that the UN 
peacekeeping network has facilitated greater organisational learning within their own 
bureaucracy and within peacekeeping missions.31 However, as Benner et. all also note, while 
integration between peace missions and other UN agents on the ground has strengthened, 
barriers still exist at the institutional level.  
																																																						
26 Susanna P Campbell, "(Dis) integration, incoherence and complexity in UN post-conflict 
Interventions." International peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (2008): 559. 
27 Ibid., 559. 
28 Ibid., 559.  
29 Ibid., 561.  
30 Benner et. all, 2011, 13-25. 
31 Ibid., 180-203. 
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The ability of the UN to systematically reform integration practices is largely dependent 
upon the harmonisation of efforts at all levels of the peace process. Obstacles to system wide 
“organisational learning on integration” are abound; this is a result of every organisation 
creating its “own budgetary rules, standard operating procedures, and, ultimately, cultures.”32 
Disintegration in these aspects can be largely traced back to the structural setup of the UN. As 
Benner et. all continue, “different funding sources create different channels for member states 
to exert power, which in turn shapes different accountability mechanisms and incentives for 
each organisation.”33 As such, fragmentation exists within funding sources, reporting and 
oversight mechanisms, and in mission planning/mandate creation. Similarly, Julian Junk has 
coined the phrase “heterogeneity within the sponsoring coalition” to explain this process. Like 
both Campbell and Benner et. all, Junk similarly concludes that “preferences among the state 
and organisational actors”... “lead to diffused authority in peace operation structures.”34 
Success in peacekeeping is thus dependent upon coherence and integration within all layers of 
a multi-level system; this includes top down coherence within the UN structure alongside 
integration with the host government of the peacekeeping operation. The exact areas of 
integration and the operational mechanisms employed to achieve coherence has been further 
elaborated on by Ben Mills.  
 In an exploration designed to unravel the often used metaphor of “too many cooks in 
the kitchen”, Mills outlines the framework in which coherence within the peacebuilding 
process can be analysed. Building off similar outlines created by Paris and De Coning35, Mills 
asserts that through understanding four specific areas within the peacebuilding process, the 
complex conundrum of coordination and coherence can be fully understood.36 In order to 
address issues of coherence and coordination at both a field level and at the “headquarters” 
level, Mills has developed a four-point methodology to explain integration. Based upon an 
exhaustive review of existing frameworks, Mills asserts that integration should be subdivided 
and evaluated based upon entity coherence, donor harmonisation, strategic alignment and 
operational coherence.37 The four elements are described as follows:  
 
																																																						
32 Ibid., 177. 
33 Ibid., 178. 
34 Julian Junk, "Function follows form: The organizational design of peace operations." Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding 6, no. 3 (2012): 299. 
35 Paris & Sink, 2009; De Coning 2007. 
36 Ben Mills, "Too many cooks: Integrating the recipes for post-conflict development." International Journal of 
Development and Conflict 3, no. 1 (2013): 14-16. 
37 Ibid., 14-15.  
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1. Entity coherence, where both states and IGOs such as the UN ensure that policies and 
operations across their disparate agencies are unified and coordinated within a given 
post-conflict context   
2. Donor harmonisation, where donors (both state and IGO) strive towards harmonisation 
and integration of their various policy and development objectives   
3. Strategic alignment, where at senior levels donor states, IGOs, and key NGOs align 
their actions against a joint strategic plan owned by host government and local civil 
society representatives   
4. Operational coherence, where at a ‘field level’ relevant actors in relevant contexts 
ensure that their on-the-ground activities are coherent38 
 
Mills’ outline is a revised framework built upon existing foundational theories within the 
field. Therefore, this author finds the four areas discussed by Mills to be fundamental to 
explaining and describing any current peacebuilding mission. If integration is to be successful, 
coherence and coordination must exist within and between these four delineated areas. The 
degree to which they do is then of vital understanding to each peacekeeping mission. However, 
due to limitations in the scope of this paper as well as the reliability and type of evidence 
available at such a distance from Haiti, this paper will focus solely on an exploration into 
operational coherence and strategic alignment within the MINUSTAH mission and UN 
humanitarian system in Haiti. An explanation of the policies and operations across the UN 
system within Haiti will go some way to illustrating the various mechanisms in place to foster 
integration and coherence within the Haitian peacekeeping arena. Additionally, how these UN-
wide policies are integrated into the existing state architecture is of vital importance to 
understanding the interplay between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, as well as determining 
the degree to which integration has taken place. This essay will thus have two main 
components: firstly, to explain the evolution of the Security-Development Nexus in the 
MINUSTAH mission, and secondly, to identify the architecture developed by the UN as a 
means of harmonizing security, development and relief efforts. As of yet, Haiti remains under-
referenced within the academic world, and as such is deserved of greater attention, especially 
since the 2010 earthquake created additional challenges beyond existing development and 
																																																						
38 Ibid., 15.  
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security concerns. Similar studies have recently surfaced on The Congo39, Libya40 and 
Burundi41, and this case study will hope to add to those reports in an effort to provide additional 
case-based evidence in the field of peacekeeping/peacebuilding integration.  
 
Methodology 
 
The majority of research for this essay has been conducted through desk research. An 
exhaustive archival research methodology has been employed to unearth both primary and 
secondary source data. Constraints found in accessing the relevant information from such a 
distance from Haiti has been that much of the accessible information is limited to formal reports 
issued by the UN entities themselves. Therefore, this project has utilised this information and 
remained cognisant of the potential bias of all source materials. All sources have been selected 
in order to maintain a balance between official reports from UN entities, NGOs and critical 
academic material. In this way the research selected for this project is as objective and 
conclusive as possible. Additionally, much of the literature is centred around the immediate 
humanitarian response to the Haitian earthquake. Therefore, the study of integration in 
humanitarian space in this essay will focus on coordination within the immediate aftermath 
(2010-2011) of the 2010 earthquake, to identify how coherence and integration practices within 
UN integrated missions are made evident as a result of additional strain on the peacekeeping 
system. Likewise, the study of integration and strategic alignment within security-development 
policies will relate to evolutions in this arena from 2010 onwards. Specifically, it will make 
reference to the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) developed in 2010-2011 as a result of 
the new-found needs of the Haitian community in the aftermath of the earthquake.  
This project delineates between two different types of integration: vertical and 
horizontal. Horizontal integration refers to “the search for more effective, and more strategic 
coordination of effort across the broad range of international actors involved in peace-building 
operations.”42 Vertical integration refers to “the need for improved coherence and coordination 
up and down the chain of relationships that link international-level, state-level and local-level 
																																																						
39 Arvid Ekengard, "Coordination and coherence in the peace operation in de Democratic Republic of Congo." 
Division of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency, (2009). 
40 Sebastian Döring and Melanie Schreiner, "Inter-agency coordination in United Nations peacebuilding: 
practical implications from a micro-level analysis of the United Nations family in Liberia," (2008). 
41 Felix Haas, “Coordinating to build peace? Lessons from the UN Peacebuilding Commission's engagement 
with Burundi,” United States Institute of Peace (2012). 
42 Timothy Donais and Geoff Burt, "Peace-building in Haiti: the case for vertical integration." Conflict, Security 
& Development 15, no. 1 (2015): 4. 
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actors in peacebuilding contexts.”43 Given the nature of this project and its emphasis on 
coordination mechanisms within the UN structure, the main body of this work will focus on 
horizontal integration within the UN peacekeeping system in Haiti. To conclude, the degree to 
which vertical integration is present within the UN system will be analysed. Identified 
throughout has been the threefold dilemmas of security management, political and social 
development, and humanitarian relief. Through the utilisation of Ben Mill’s concepts of 
Strategic Alignment and Operational Coherence, this essay will investigate how the UN system 
has internally constructed itself to achieve greater coherence and strategic alignment within 
these integrated arenas.  
Using operational coherence to mean the degree to which at a field level relevant actors 
in relevant contexts ensure that their on-the-ground activities are coherent, and strategic 
alignment to mean the degree to which the UN has aligned their actions against a joint strategic 
plan owned by host government and local civil society representatives, this essay will subdivide 
its efforts to distinguish between the degrees of operational coherence and strategic alignment 
evident in the security/development and humanitarian relief arenas respectively. Within the 
relief arena, humanitarian integration will be explained in relation to the UN’s Cluster 
Coordination model. Two elements are considered: how cluster coordination works within the 
Haitian relief effort, and how these humanitarian efforts are situated within the wider 
peacebuilding process. As a means of identifying coherence among interlinked security and 
development goals, the UN’s Integrated Strategic Framework will be analysed to identify how 
development policies have been universalized across the UN system and aligned with local 
objectives. MINUSTAH’s strategic alignment will be determined through an examination of 
vertical integration techniques within the peacebuilding system; the degree to which local 
ownership and alignment with the host government’s priorities will be identified to reveal 
whether the UN peacebuilding apparatus is coherent with the goals and infrastructure of the 
Haitian government.  
To begin, this thesis will conduct a conclusive analysis of peacekeeping’s evolution 
within the United Nations so as to provide an adequate historical narrative capable of housing 
the current Haitian peacebuilding debate. The MINUSTAH mission will be situated within the 
“generation” concept, detailing how MINUSTAH’s increasingly complex and multi-faceted 
mandate is reflective of a larger system-wide trend towards tension between humanitarian 
intervention and peace enforcement. It will then trace the evolution of the MINUSTAH up until 
																																																						
43 Ibid. 4. 
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the 2010 Earthquake to indicate the degree to which state-building and humanitarian relief 
efforts have become entwined. Lastly, this essay will continue with an analysis of the 
integration methods utilised by the Haitian peacekeeping diaspora to foster greater coherence 
and coherence within the peacebuilding system. To conclude, this essay will highlight the 
major challenges facing further integration and coherence in the Haitian peacebuilding system.  
 
Generational Peacekeeping & the Security-Development Nexus  
 
In order to fully comprehend the complex arena in which peacebuilding integration occurs, one 
must first understand how peacekeeping has evolved to encompass more than mere security 
operations. In fact, modern peacekeeping is a multi-dimensional enterprise, consisting of 
interlinked operations that have come about due to concerns over the capacity of the 
international community to provide sustainable peace. Peace operations can be situated within 
generational developments that are representative of both changes in global politics and in 
conceptions of peacekeeping effectiveness. The MINUSTAH mission in its current incarnation 
is considered to be a fourth generation mission; fourth generations peacekeeping missions are 
characterised by their emphasis on both peacekeeping through the use of force and their 
mandated focus on peacebuilding processes.44 This generation of missions can be distinguished 
from previous generations largely due to a departure from emphasis on conflict management. 
Greater emphasis is placed upon institution building, facilitating elections and development 
goals.45 As such, development and security are functionally different, but part of a broader 
more interwoven web. How this evolution has taken place is fundamentally important to 
understanding the development of the MINUSTAH mission up until the 2010 earthquake; the 
ideological and practical developments within the UN and the MINUSTAH mission will be 
divulged below.  
United Nations peacekeeping projects can be situated within a larger ideological trend, 
that being the movement towards the protection of individuals as opposed to the welfare of 
individual states. As a result of the changing nature of global conflict, the world saw a decrease 
in tensions between the East and the West and observed the rising intra-state tensions that 
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ultimately led to a number of civil wars and internal conflicts.46 Combating this transformation 
in conflict required an evolution of ideas; the idea and concept of human security became the 
calling cry of the international community, and has since defined the manner in which 
international security has been sought.47 The development of the concept of human security 
was “perhaps the most radical shift in thinking on peace and the avoidance of conflict since the 
UN was founded.”48 In regard to intervention, peacebuilding operations and their pursuit of 
peace and security was conceptually altered.  The role of the United Nations in peacekeeping 
was now defined by their ability to secure human security through peace enforcement.49  It is 
in the light of these ideological revelations that peacekeeping took on a new mantra, one that 
attempted to blend humanitarianism with conflict prevention.  
The second generation of UN peacekeeping developments is grounded in this rationale; 
intervention through enforcing physical security was the method behind securing the rights of 
individuals, and subsequently, the stability of the international system. The changing dynamics 
in the post-Cold War society created a new framework for development politics, one where 
policy was dictated by a “security framework within which the modalities of underdevelopment 
have become dangerous.”50 In the post-Cold War era, development and international peace was 
seen as directly dependent upon resolving the intra-state wars in conflict affected states. 
Conflict resolution under the auspices of humanitarianism defined the second and third 
generations of peacekeeping operations, and was codified by the UN in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 
report entitled Agenda for Peace.51 
Development - both social and political - through security became the dominant 
paradigm under which numerous peacekeeping forces in the 1990s and early 2000s were 
mandated. The security of individuals from conflict became a banner under which social and 
political development could be sought; in the eyes of policy makers achieving one aim was 
inherently dependent upon achieving the other.52 The interweaving of these once distinct 
elements became the hallmark that defined the methodological practices of UN peacekeeping 
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missions. In many eyes, the nascent obsession of the international community with providing 
development through physical security has opened up the UN to criticism from both its internal 
practitioners as well as within academia.53 The human security dominated developmental 
agenda was flawed in its conception54 and ultimately resulted in peacekeeping practices that 
were ideologically and practically insufficient for the demands of many conflict affected states.  
As the UN grew in scope and mandate during this period, so had their influence in 
providing international security. While 13 operations were established in the first 40 years of 
UN peacekeeping history, 28 new security operations were launched between 1988 and 2001.55 
The mobilisation of resources to solve conflict became the customary response to internal state 
conflicts that took place in low-power countries.56 The UN’s so-called “liberal peace agenda” 
is reflective of the international community’s emphasis on military intervention; wide-spread 
military peacekeeping has been utilised as the primary mechanism of stabilising potentially 
volatile states. This method creates a stable environment for “state-building”, which is a top-
down approach to lay the groundwork for the establishment of liberal institutions by providing 
physical security.57 The development of human security thus became entwined with an 
institutional approach overly concerned with the UN’s global agenda of democratizing fragile 
states. In this context, the peacebuilding processes have become preoccupied with trying to 
create peace through mechanisms that “transcend the interests of actors engaged in the 
conflict.”58  The United Nations as the main party to this process, have used force to “clear the 
way, or provide security, for their own actions and interventions in conflict zones.”59 As such, 
it is often the case that peacekeeping processes adopt an overly security-orientated approach to 
providing stability, and this was very much the case with second and third generation 
operations.60 The military based approach to state/peacebuilding is almost contradictory in 
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nature; the establishment of peace is conceivably only viable through “humanitarian war.”61 
From 1992-1996 alone, Somalia, the former state of Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda and Angola were recipients of international armed forces.62  The perceived failures of 
these missions is well-known, and reformations of the principles of military intervention were 
and still are subject to considerable change. The military method, and humanitarian war, were 
however still largely fundamental to the methods employed by UN peacekeeping missions 
throughout the early 2000s. Their effectiveness and applicability - or lack thereof - has become 
a topic for debate.  
At the heart of this debate is the criticism of the perceived failure of the UN’s one-size 
fits all framework; as Eirini Lemos-Maniati has asserted, security orientated operations “have 
manifested the fact that peacekeeping is not a panacea for every case of international 
disorder.”63 Rather, the need for context specific mandates lies at the heart of many 
methodology driven critiques of UN peacekeeping. Even within conflict environments, there 
are a variety of variables; this includes whether the conflict is inter-state or civil, beyond that, 
civil violence usually incorporates more actors or opposing sides than interstate violence.64 The 
conclusion here, as Diehl and Druckman have asserted, is that there is “considerable variation 
among the contexts of operations”; the type of conflict, the conflict phase, the disputant 
characteristics, the involvement of external actors, the geographic location and the various 
interactions among these variables serve to create unique circumstances and unique solutions 
to each case.65 In addition to the characteristics of the conflict, contemporary peace operations 
also have multiple missions. As Diehl and Druckman continue, “different missions necessitate 
divergent skill sets for peacekeepers and may involve fundamentally different conditions for 
success.”66 Therefore, there will be “some elements of the environment that are more relevant 
for certain missions than others.”67 The evolution of thought away from the security dominant 
agenda is evidenced within the Fourth generation of UN peacekeeping operations.  
The fourth generation of missions grew out of the failures of the security orientated 
approach dominant throughout the peace operations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
fourth generation of missions included mandates that encompassed more focused security 
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measures alongside context driven peacebuilding operations. 68 This generation of missions 
moved away from traditional conflict management and towards peacebuilding that focused on 
the root causes of conflict and development issues. Still grounded in the human security ideals 
of past operations, modern peacekeeping endeavors are larger and more complex in scope. The 
use of force is embedded alongside the locally owned processes that foster long-term peace 
and development. The MINUSTAH mission is reflective of this new generation of missions, 
and its evolution from its initial form is reminiscent of the move away from conflict 
management and towards robust peacebuilding measures.  
 
MINUSTAH’s Multi-Dimensional Character 
 
The initial incarnation of the MINUSTAH mission is reflective of the UN’s past security 
orientated agenda, however, its evolution towards hybridity and integration make it a hallmark 
study for the increased interconnectedness and integration between the elements of security, 
development and humanitarianism within the peacekeeping/peacebuilding process. The 
literature in this regard has thus far served to illustrate the origins and inefficiencies of the 
security-orientated approach, of particular attention in the context of Haiti is the observation 
that Haiti is not a traditional post-conflict state. Reginald Dumas, who served as Kofi Annan’s 
special advisor on Haiti in 2004, has observed that Haiti did not represent a conflict dilemma. 
Haiti was not a country at civil war, but as Dumas notes, “there was civil unrest, but a massive 
military and police operation, with a strong, even lopsided emphasis on troops, did not seem to 
me the answer to the question.”69 The MINUSTAH operation, which began in 2004, was 
deployed to resolve civil conflict so as to aid in the transition to democratic peace processes. 
However, the evolution of the mission has shown it to reflect a paradigmatic shift in thought 
away from the security dominant agenda of the previous decade’s peacekeeping missions. Its 
evolution has taken place within the context of the criticisms and redevelopment of ideas 
regarding how to create peace and development in the growingly interconnected arena of 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding.    
The demand for a context specific mandate that addresses the root causes of Haiti’s 
fragility is at the heart of MINUSTAH’s redevelopment. Kamil Shah, a scholar who echoes 
this sentiment, asserts that the UN’s emphasis on policing fragile states is an unnecessary pre-
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occupation of the international community. Shah has evaluated Haitian peacekeeping in 
relation to the UN’s emphasis on the top-down approach to development in Haiti. In her eyes, 
a focus on providing policing and territorial security is the function of a state-driven 
modernisation project.70 Within this framework, state building through the establishment of 
western liberal institutions is a mechanism of forcing development without addressing 
fundamental social problems within the state; evidently, the peacebuilding project in Haiti was 
being implemented with little regard for context.71 State-building in the image of western 
democracies - as the UN had imagined it - leaves many areas of concern within fragile states 
unaddressed.  
The most critical error in peacekeeping’s state-building practice stems from an absence 
of knowledge of how to rebuild states and additional failures of state building methods.72 As 
Kirsti Samuels has identified, “conflict cessation without modification of the political 
environment is unlikely to succeed.”73 The rebuilding aspects in the post conflict arena are as 
much a necessity as the need to provide security, further asserting that a “successful political 
and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission.”74 
To create stability and development, security must coincide with a functional and context 
driven plan that will foster socioeconomic and political development.75 In light of these 
criticisms, the UN and the MINUSTAH mission itself reformed their practices; the mid to late 
2000s saw a re-orientation towards more efficient and relevant peacekeeping/peacebuilding 
strategies. Robert Maguire, drawing on a UN report written by Oxford economist Paul Collier,  
has noted that “MINUSTAH’s first order of business was deployment to provide immediate 
security.”76 However, the mission has come to reflect a growing need to move away from a 
military minded operation and towards a more locally owned development process. As 
Maguire also notes, “from a U.N. perspective, MINUSTAH’s Plan A peacekeeping orientation 
had shown itself as a necessary, but insufficient approach for achieving enduring peace in 
Haiti.”77 A number of health crises, financial crises and natural disasters have clouded the 
terrain. Although political dialogue had been facilitated and security operations had achieved 
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small successes, less progress had been achieved in the area of social and economic 
development.78  
As a result of the Brahimi report (2000) and a system wide evaluation of peacekeeping 
practices79, the UN has shifted its focus away from security and towards the structural and 
systemic problems that underlie any resulting physical insecurity within the Haitian state.  The 
“Plan B” approach adopted since the initial years of MINUSTAH built itself up within the 
context of a system-wide evolution of thought away from past peacekeeping and state-building 
ideas; a more robust approach to socio-economic development has been developed. Maguire 
concludes that “there is broad agreement within the U.N. and with Haitian officials on the 
importance of heightened emphasis on manufacturing, agriculture, job creation, education, 
health, disaster preparedness and poverty reduction as necessary pre-conditions for the 
improvement and maintenance of security.”80 A re-orientation in practice has led to the UN 
creating a framework which prioritises institutional rebuilding, territorial rebuilding, social 
rebuilding and economic rebuilding as the primary mission objectives.81 
Gerard Le Chevallier, a former director within the MINUSTAH mission - before his 
untimely death in the 2010 Haitian earthquake - has likewise asserted that MINUSTAH became 
unparalleled in its wide scope and mandate in the years after its initial implementation. 
Although acknowledging the continuing shortcomings of a security dominant mandate, Le 
Chevallier asserts that the MINUSTAH operation grew to incorporate “more systemic and 
holistic efforts for rule-of-law sector reform - police, judiciary and penal.”82 In his eyes, 
MINUSTAH represented the only mechanism by which lasting peace and stability could be 
reached within Haiti. In order to achieve this, MINUSTAH would “have to address the root 
causes of Haiti’s instability by promoting democratic governance, strengthening the capacity 
of state institutions and helping Haiti begin a genuine economic recovery process.”83 Evidently, 
there is a consensus among scholars and practitioners alike regarding what needs to be done by 
the international community to solve Haiti’s developmental problems. However, alongside 
growing economic and political issues, Haiti has been further ravaged by natural disasters that 
have plunged the fragile state into further disrepair.  
																																																						
78 Ibid., 3.  
79 See footnote 26.  
80 Ibid., 2.  
81 International Organisation for Migration, MINUSTAH Logistics Base. IOM-Haiti Strategic Plan 2013-2014. 
Port-au-Prince: IOM, 2013: 9.  
82 Gerard Le Chevallier, “The MINUSTAH Experience.” In Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 2011), 120.  
83 Ibid., 118.	
	 22	
The 2010 Haitian earthquake killed over 220,000 people and left over 2.3 million 
homeless.84 Adding to an already volatile situation, the earthquake facilitated greater 
weakening of the Haitian government and also the ability of the peacekeeping apparatus to 
continue existing development projects. Institutions such as the Presidential Palace, the 
Parliament, the Supreme Court and most public administration buildings were destroyed.85 The 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities of the UN were stalled, and what was already a 
complex arena was further sunken into chaos. Previous peacebuilding efforts were damaged, 
and created additional humanitarian obstacles as well as exasperating existing problems.86 To 
combat this, MINUSTAH and the UN agencies became peacebuilding entities and disaster 
relief operations simultaneously. Haiti thus faced political and financial instability as well as 
the immediate threats of famine, violence and additional natural disasters. What Haiti required 
was a triple-pronged long term strategy that incorporates security, development and 
humanitarian aid.87 The incorporation of these areas into a single mission was however, no 
simple task; the multi-dimensional character of such a mission is inherently complicated and 
intricate in nature. The manner in which these different elements come together and interact is 
fundamental to the success of the operation. The complexity of this dysfunctional arena is thus 
worthy of considerable study, given its importance to operational success. As Jose Raul Perales 
has so eloquently summarised:  
“The magnitude of the 2010 earthquake, both in terms of the disaster and the 
strong international response, may yet open a new chapter for understanding 
the complex interplay between international cooperation and state-building, 
especially new ways of crafting such cooperation and how different kinds of 
actors can act cohesively and constructively.” 88 
This essay will now turn to investigating this dynamic.  
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Coherence in Humanitarian Space  
 
One of the largest challenges facing the UN peacekeeping system is coordination and 
integration within humanitarian space. The multidimensional character of peace operations 
necessitates linkages between what in theory should be independent aspects of the 
peacebuilding mission. Integration within the humanitarian relief sector has two relevant 
dynamics: coordination between humanitarian actors themselves and between humanitarian 
entities and the larger peacekeeping system (civil-military relations).89 The UN system has 
developed organisational mechanisms to solve these dynamics within the hierarchical structure 
of the peacekeeping mission as well as in the cluster coordination framework developed for 
large scale relief operations. The division of labour within humanitarian coordination involves 
two main UN entities. The MINUSTAH mission and the UN country team coordinate 
humanitarian operations through the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), while the United Nations 
office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) operates parallel to the 
MINUSTAH mission to directly coordinate humanitarian projects between UN entities, NGOs 
and other donors under the supervision of the HC (See Annex 1).  
The integrated nature of the MINUSTAH mission dictates that at a policy level, 
strategies are theoretically coordinated through liaison between the  HC and OCHA, leading to 
coherent strategies between UN agencies and external partners.90 Clouding this terrain is the 
role of civil-military relations, as through the integrated process MINUSTAH is mandated to 
provide military and security resources in the humanitarian context.91 The structural layup of 
humanitarian activity within the peacekeeping process does provide scope for coordination 
between the humanitarian agents and the MINUSTAH mission. As OCHA indicates, “the 
implementation of seemingly similar activities by humanitarian actors and military and police 
actors within the same geographical terrain has necessitated various forms of civil-military 
coordination and engagement.”92 The operational arrangement in this terrain is reliant upon the 
authority of the HC. The HC serves a triple hatted role in that he/she is also the Deputy Senior 
Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) and the Resident Coordinator (RC).93 In 
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theory, the DSRSG/RC/HC is ideally situated to coordinate civil-military relations due to his 
involvement in each individual sector of the peacekeeping mission. As such, the HC is 
responsible for coordinating all provisions of humanitarian assistance provided by the military 
component of the MINUSTAH operation.  
The mechanism created to facilitate coherence in this regard is the Joint Operations 
Tasking Centre (JOTC). The JOTC brings together the MINUSTAH military component, 
OCHA, the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and the Logistics Cluster to 
facilitate system wide coherence throughout the deployment of security resources in 
humanitarian space.94 As the JOTC guidelines dictate, support must be provided as needed 
through established humanitarian coordination mechanisms: the JOTC serves as the liaison 
between the DSRG/HC/RC and the  MINUSTAH military and police components as well as 
with OCHA and humanitarian cluster coordinators (see Annex 2).95 The success of this 
operation is dependent upon the pursuit of complementary and not conflicting efforts with 
independent humanitarian actors, and as such the JOTC mechanism serves to provide 
humanitarian actors with a “simple process to access military, police and mission logistics 
assistance.”96 In addition to civil-military coordination, the humanitarian sector has its own 
additional challenges to mission coherence.   
The primary mechanism of coordination within humanitarian space is the cluster 
model; OCHA leads this process of disaster relief and facilitates coherence between UN 
agencies as well as NGOs and other actors. Within the UN diaspora, OCHA delineates 
humanitarian clusters based upon areas of concern (see Annex 3). There are, as of 2010, 12 
clusters: Coordination and Camp Management (IOM); Agriculture (FAO);  Education 
(UNICEF), Early Recovery (UNDP), Food Assistance (WFP), Health (WHO/PAHO), 
Logistics (WFP), Emergency Telecommunications (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF), Protection 
(HDCS/OHCHR), Shelter and Non-Food Items (IOM), WASH (UNICEF).97 The role of 
OCHA in coordinating these mechanism is not clearly defined, despite this, OCHA is directly 
responsible for coordination between the clusters (and ultimately the UN agencies responsible 
for each individual cluster). As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Haiti has noted, 
“effective inter-cluster coordination is necessary to ensure that multidisciplinary issues cannot 
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be tackled by individual clusters alone.”98 If this is the case, gaps in efforts are created 
alongside considerable duplication of efforts.   
The implication of these mechanisms on the ground is a complicated and at times 
dysfunctional arena. Cluster mechanisms are reported to work well at the operational level, but 
inter-cluster coordination in Haiti is weak.99 OCHA were directly responsible for aiding in the 
coordination of NGOs, the Army, MINUSTAH and the separate clusters. A field report by 
OCHA themselves revealed that many humanitarian entities “had no idea about clusters or of 
the role of OCHA.”100 Likewise, UNDP assert that decision-making and communication lines 
were confused, leading to disintegration and incoherence between the relief clusters.101 
Therefore, the various entities on the ground receive little cohesive direction from either the 
HC (MINUSTAH) or from OCHA. Additionally, inter-cluster coordination and coherence 
between NGOs and OCHA is limited. The sheer number of NGOs in Haiti serves to compound 
this problem; providing a framework for cooperation between all NGOs and UN entities is a 
virtual impossibility.102 NGOs, like UN entities, often have their own mandates, funding 
sources and structures, further complicating the degrees of coordination with OCHA and the 
cluster framework. Inter-cluster interdependency also lacked cohesion. Despite OCHA’s 
mandate as the lead coordinator of humanitarian activities, UNICEF, WHO and WFP all took 
leading roles as central coordinators of aid activity.103 Although superficially acting in unison, 
the degree to which agencies coordinated within the cluster framework is limited; OCHA 
themselves conclude that “OCHA needs to facilitate embedding of cluster coordinators by 
cluster lead agencies” in future practices.104 
In regard to coordination between MINUSTAH and OCHA, the linkages are also 
minimal. Despite the JOTC mechanism and the HC’s involvement in both humanitarian and 
civil operations, little coherence exists between MINUSTAH and OCHA’s humanitarian 
objectives.105 OCHA in Haiti have adopted the “one foot in and one foot out” approach, 
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whereby a “DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed, but OCHA maintains a clearly identifiable presence 
outside the mission structure.”106 This approach leaves OCHA and the HC/MINUSTAH 
functionally separate, indicating cluster humanitarian projects are linked to MINUSTAH 
objectives and activities in theory, but not always in practice. As OCHA themselves conclude, 
OCHA’s humanitarian mandate is sometimes at odds with MINUSTAH’s long term role in the 
country; clear guidance in how OCHA’s humanitarian role interfaces with that of mission is 
not codified and creates a mystic and inefficient interdependency between the two key areas of 
the peacekeeping and development process.107 
Confusion is further aided by OCHA’s position within the integrated mission; the HC’s 
role as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Resident Coordinator 
creates overlap between the functions of the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA’s 
humanitarian coordination role. Historically (pre-2009), OCHA’s presence in Haiti has been 
weak, necessitating the adoption of humanitarian work by MINUSTAH.108 Therefore, much of 
the humanitarian work in Haiti was conducted within the architecture of MINUSTAH’s 
existing Humanitarian and Development Coordination sector. Despite OCHA’s efforts at 
increasing their presence in Haiti prior to the 2010 earthquake, in the relief efforts immediately 
after the quake most international actors and local entities were confused as to who was leading 
the humanitarian coordination efforts - MINUSTAH or OCHA?109 Beyond coordination 
problems, the integrated MINUSTAH operation and the dynamic with OCHA created 
significant concerns within the NGO community. The peacekeeping operation’s involvement 
in humanitarian objectives created concerns over the role of politically sensitive operations 
invading impartial humanitarian space. Shifting the integration mechanisms of the 
MINUSTAH mission into humanitarian space has large implications for the “independence of 
decision-making on humanitarian priorities.”110 Opposition to such integration has been made 
evident by NGOs such as Oxfam, and creates further tensions between integrating 
humanitarian projects with those of the wider security and development objectives.  
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Integrated State-building 
 
The peacebuilding process in Haiti is further defined by the intersubjective dimensions of 
security and development. Development cannot be achieved without security, and security is 
only sustainable through the establishment of long-term social and economic development. 
Therefore, security sector reform (SSR) and institutional state-building are part and parcel of 
the same project; managing conflict relies on solving the root systemic and structural causes 
within the state. Within Haiti, the root causes of political and social insecurity lie in poverty, 
weak or dysfunctional government institutions, environmental degradation, wide-scale 
unemployment, and gang and political violence.111 To illustrate this point further: over 80% of 
the population live under the poverty line and 54% live in abject poverty; Haiti is among the 
top five in income inequality worldwide; unemployment rates lie between 40-50% and over 
half the population have no access to drinking water.112 Haiti is in need of judicial reform, 
economic and social development and political stability; the manner in which this can be 
brought about is through effective state-building mechanisms that address these root concerns.  
MINUSTAH is mandated to “ensure a secure and sustainable environment” through 
monitoring, rebuilding and assisting the Haitian state through the use of its development and 
security divisions.113 Success is dependent upon the utilisation of both security and 
development projects, which are likewise dependent upon one another for their own individual 
success. As Cedric De Coning has noted, effective peacebuilding is dependent upon a 
“collective framework in which peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law and human rights 
and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country 
level.”114 Co-operation and coherence within this country-wide strategy is a necessity for 
success, and the manner in which the UN and MINUSTAH forges this coherence is through an 
Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). What follows is an explanation of the mechanisms 
created to foster agency and strategy interdependence in the security and development arena. 
To conclude, this section will evaluate the on the ground operational coherence and degree to 
which strategic alignment has been maintained with national and local actors. 
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 The Integrated Strategic Framework produced in 2011 sought to bring together all 
aspects of the MINUSTAH and UN peacekeeping enterprise into a singular over-arching 
framework. Not only did it prescribe the development goals in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake, but it provided a benchmark against which the integrated mission could judge its 
success, coherence and system-wide strategy. The ISF articulated what MINUSTAH and the 
UN Country Team’s relationship would be, and how the strategy for the UN was a “shared 
vision” between the UN and the GOH. Most notably for the purposes of integration, the ISF 
articulated the “division of responsibilities among UN entities for the delivery of mutually 
reinforcing tasks for peace consolidation, social and economic recovery and long-term 
development.”115 The ISF set in stone the long-running and growingly interconnected 
disciplines of security enforcement through the presence of military personnel, and the 
rebuilding mechanisms that create state institutions at the national and local level capable of 
providing policing, justice and public administration services.116 To address coherence issues, 
the ISF even articulated the creation of the UN Joint Planning Team that worked to avoid 
overlaps between the development and security projects.117 In addition, the Integrated Mission 
Task Force (IMTF) for Haiti was established that brought together all UN agencies, including 
MINUSTAH and OCHA representatives to coordinate coherence in all long-term strategies.118 
Overall, MINUSTAH and 16 resident UN agencies were theoretically aligned through the ISF 
joint strategy, and various inter-agency mechanisms were established that addressed 
coordination concerns that were made evident in humanitarian activities as well as in pre-
earthquake agency interactions.  
 The primary mechanism of coordination within the new UN structure in Haiti was the 
enlarged Integrated Strategic Planning Group (ISPG). The ISPG was comprised of 
MINUSTAH heads of sections, the GOH, and UN country Team officials.119 Under the ISPG’s 
supervision, a “three-level working structure” was employed to ensure the coordinated 
implementation of tasks funded by the UN. The three levels are: Strategic, Policy and 
Operational. Within the strategic and policy levels, the ISPG adopts the oversight role and is 
responsible for policy and strategy alignment within the UN system. However, at the 
operational level (on the ground), agencies within the UN structure are independently 
																																																						
115 The United Nations System in Haiti, UN Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti. Port-au-Prince: United 
Nations, 2010, 2. 
116 Ibid., 9-11. 
117 Ibid., 10.  
118 Ibid., 12.  
119 Ibid., 13.  
	 29	
responsible for the oversight, enforcement and outcome of the four “pillar” objectives: 
institutional, territorial, economic and social rebuilding.120 As Campbell, Benner et. all and 
Junk have all noted, integration is dependent upon the harmonisation of efforts by all UN agents 
operating within the system; heterogeneity among the coalition creates opposing mandates, 
conflicting budgetary requirements and ultimately disparate goals, objectives and outcomes.121 
The many different agencies in the UN peacebuilding structure, as identified by the ISF, is 
reflective of the pitfalls made evident by the aforementioned scholars.  
 Within the ISF outlined structure territorial, economic, environmental and social 
rebuilding are further subdivided into separate specialties. The ISF distinguishes lead partners 
for each activity, prioritizing the oversight role of a particular UN agency to facilitate cohesion 
and accountability. Ultimately, MINUSTAH is the lead partner in state building and security 
operations, adopting the primary oversight role in all six areas122 within the institutional 
rebuilding environment. Outside of institutional rebuilding efforts, fifteen UN agencies123 
operate as leads and partners (in conjunction with MINUSTAH) to achieve social, territorial 
and environment, and economic rebuilding objectives. Despite the creation of “Joint 
Programmes”, created to facilitate joint resource mobilisation and greater coherence between 
lead and partner agencies, each UN agency and partner has “equal programmatic and financial 
accountability for their activities in the various pillars.”124 As such, each partner and lead 
agency is motivated and controlled by their own budgeting systems and financial accountability 
despite the creation of joint objectives.  
In theory, the ISF created a framework for the coordination of objectives and mandates 
that would enhance the coordination of effort towards focused and parallel goals that were 
structurally and thematically interdependent. MINUSTAH is a partner in all institutional 
rebuilding activities, from police and judicial reform, to providing adequate infrastructure for 
sanitary conditions, clean water and educational facilities. However, the necessary 
interdependency is largely reliant upon the pursuant of common goals, and operational 
coherence on the ground is still limited as a result of the independent and autonomous character 
of the individual UN agencies and donors working in conjunction with one another. The 
question of donor coherence raises its ugly head here. A full account of integration and 
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coherence across bilateral and MINUSTAH donors is beyond the scope of this paper, however, 
a brief glance at coherence between South American donors reveals the degree of dysfunction 
within donor countries. Argentina, Brazil and Chile stand as three of the largest donors to the 
MINUSTAH mission and to the Haitian government. However, their bilateral policies reveal 
limited coherence between their individual and collective efforts. The mere fact that all three 
countries pursue individual bilateral policies alongside their prolonged involvement in 
UNASUR and MINUSTAH aid to Haiti reveals the duplication of efforts and inefficiencies 
that are inherent in both IO and state donors.125 Diplomatic discourse and operational coherence 
on the ground do not go hand in hand, and Haiti continues to be emblematic of this problem.  
The ISF also fails to account for the long term development goals of the Haitian state. 
While the ISF is created in tandem with the GOH’s Action Plan for Recovery and 
Development, the UN’s emphasis on horizontal integration within their own system largely 
ignores the shortcomings of the UN’s strategic alignment with local-level actors. Coordination 
between international actors presupposes that the local government and community are fully 
cognisant and accepting of the objectives of the international community. Vertical integration 
is important here, and the ISF and MINUSTAH’s current policies indicate that little room is 
left for cooperation along the international-national axis. While along the horizontal axis the 
ISF serves to conceptualise the interdependencies between the international actors, along the 
vertical axis, integrated work plans are non-existent.126 In fact, local level actors (Civil Affairs 
Officers (CAOs)) who are part of the MINUSTAH and UN structure are separately mandated 
and tasked. The ISF creates the space for broad cooperation of macro scale objectives, however, 
at local and regional levels strategies, operation mechanisms and alignment between such 
operations are blurred if not non-existent.127 As one CAO working in Haiti remarked on the 
lack of coordination practices in 2011: “There is a lot of reluctance and resistance from 
agencies, who are scared of losing their space.”128 What becomes apparent is the need for 
greater harmonisation in efforts beyond strategy creation; conceptual planning must occur in 
tandem with funding and oversight planning in order for agencies and staff to maintain their 
own prominent role in the peacekeeping process.  
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The desire for integration exists, however true operational coherence and strategic 
alignment with international, national and local objectives is far from the reality. The security 
sector in Haiti serves as a further paradigmatic example: the UN’s revised strategy to counter 
violent threats involved a joint planning programme between MINUSTAH and UNDP. 
MINUSTAH would be responsible for creating capacity within the Haitian state to facilitate 
Disarmament, Development and Reintegration (DDR) of violent actors, while UNDP was to 
take a bottom up local approach to reinforcing local communities in their violence reduction 
efforts. Additionally, UN efforts would be aligned with those of the Commission nationale de 
désarmement, démantèlement et reinsertion (CNDDR); the CNDDR was the local institution 
established to engage national actors in the disarmament process.129 The framework created to 
facilitate disarmament involved interdependency between these three actors. However, as 
Donais and Burt’s conclusive field report on vertical integration within community violence 
projects indicated, “from the beginning, the UN’s integrated approach suffered from limited 
coordination between its top-down and bottom-up components.”130 Their relationship was 
characterised by friction, rigidity and a lack of communication. The CNDDR, UNDP and 
MINUSTAH all operated along unilateral lines, ignoring potential avenues for cooperation and 
integration due to differences in organisational cultures, funding sources and objectives.131 
Vertical integration, like horizontal integration, has the potential to incorporate actors in a 
multi-dimensional capacity. However, operationally, little genuine integration and 
coordination exists to foster operational coherence.  Rather ironically, United Nations 
operations, despite seemingly endless efforts to pursue coherence through integration 
techniques, have a particularly disintegrated quality about them.132 
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Conclusion 
 
In October 2016 the United Nations Security Council called for the preparation of 
MINUSTAH’s impending exit.133 MINUSTAH is now, seven years after the earthquake and 
thirteen years after its inception, once again beginning the transition process towards full 
sovereign independence of the Haitian state. The UN peacekeeping diaspora are entrenched 
into all levels of Haitian society, and their impending secession creates greater uncertainty 
about the capacity of the institutions MINUSTAH attempted to rebuild over the last 13 years 
to maintain any stability and development provided by the MINUSTAH mission. The varying 
interdependencies of the MINUSTAH mission have been explored in this paper to reveal the 
degree to which the UN has coordinated their state-building and humanitarian activities. While 
the findings of this work are largely pessimistic, this does not suggest that on the whole UN 
involvement has been a failure. In fact, the UN has made significant improvements in 
deteriorating humanitarian situations, securing volatile democratic elections and rebuilding 
weak and destroyed institutions and infrastructure. However, this paper has divulged the 
inefficiencies and conceptual shortcomings of the integrated mission structure and the 
strategies pursued through this framework.   
The creation of coordination mechanisms does not seem to be the fundamental flaw in 
fostering coherence within the UN peacekeeping structure. Rather, the implementation of 
coordination mechanisms and the subsequent abundance of multiple and at times parallel 
imperfect mechanisms better describes the horizontal integration situation within the Haitian 
UN system.134 As has been indicated, various mechanisms including cluster coordination, joint 
planning committees and integrated strategic frameworks were implemented, but operationally 
prove insufficient for their mandated tasks. If operational coherence and strategic alignment 
are to be two vital criteria for analysing - and potentially evaluating - levels of integration 
within a mission, then MINUSTAH and the UN in Haiti appear to be left wanting. However, 
perhaps complete integration and interdependency within an arena as complex as 
peacebuilding is an ultimate impossibility. Connecting what were once independent entities 
under the umbrella of a single mandate and coherent objectives requires adherence and 
compliance with varying related objectives and involves coordination between tens of IOs, 
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thousands of national actors, and thousands of NGOs.  Integration on this scale is conceptually 
daunting, and requires the full coherence of all actors at all levels of the peacebuilding process.  
As such, Ben Mill’s theoretical framework proves itself sufficient as an analytical tool 
given its emphasis on the degrees of integration present within both top-down and bottom-up 
integrated peacebuilding processes that take place at both the institutional and operational 
levels. As international actors continue to pursue coherence despite the large hurdles that 
impede their path, analysing and evaluating the degrees of operational coherence, strategic 
alignment, donor harmonisation and entity coherence present in each individual peacebuilding 
case will provide further evidence of the successes and methodology behind modern integrated 
peacebuilding practices. While operational coherence and strategic alignment in the UN system 
in Haiti have been explored in this essay, this serves as only part of the whole picture. The 
“headquarters” level of cooperation is another equally important aspect of the peacebuilding 
process that can be detailed, with specific relation to entity coherence and donor harmonisation. 
In a system predicated upon international involvement - both financial and physical - coherence 
and coordination must be integrated at all levels of the peacebuilding process.  
  Lastly, pursuing coherence brings together elements that are inherently at odds. To 
clarify this, further research is needed that can evaluate the degree to which integration can 
negatively affect the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. This would be a 180 degree turn 
from the current trend within academia and in practice, and as of yet no evaluation criteria or 
research exists to measure this. A more appropriate conclusion, given the current state of the 
research, is that universal coherence with equal levels of integration between all sectors is an 
inappropriate end-game. Differing degrees of coherence along both vertical and horizontal 
axis, between security, development and humanitarian arenas and within the respective arenas 
themselves, would likely forge greater coherence and more practical and effective 
interdependencies between the large array of agents conducting modern 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding. For Haiti’s sake, one can only hope that the flawed relationships 
between the existing peacebuilding actors has been sufficient enough to create the minimal 
conditions required for enduring peace and development. As the MINUSTAH mission draws 
to a conclusion, both academia and the UN must further engage with Haitian peacebuilding to 
evaluate and learn from the mistakes and successes of the last thirteen years.  
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Annex 1*: Coordination Structure of Humanitarian Space 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Grünewald & Sokpoh, 2010, 40. 
 
 
* In this chart MINUSTAH is represented by the “HC” (Humanitarian Coordinator), whose 
role was to serve as the representative of both MINUSTAH and the UN Country Team. As 
indicated in this chart, humanitarian operational activities on the ground took place under a 
strategic framework coordinated at the country level by the DSRG/HC/RC (and GOH) and 
implemented by a Humanitarian Country Team, which was led by OCHA.  
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Annex 2: JOTC Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OCHA Haiti, 2011, 15. 
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Annex 3: UN Clusters Coordinated by OCHA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oh & Lee, 2017, 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
